A performadox in truth-conditional semantics

Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):71-100 (1980)
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Abstract

An argument is developed at some length to show that any semantical theory which treats superficially nonperformative sentences as being governed by performative prefaces at some level of underlying structure must either leave those sentences semantically uninterpreted or assign them the wrong truth-conditions. Several possible escapes from this dilemma are examined; it is tentatively concluded that such hypotheses as the Ross-Lakoff-Sadock “Performative Analysis” should be rejected despite their attractions.

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Citations of this work

Towards a semantics for biscuit conditionals.Stefano Predelli - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):293 - 305.
Reviving the performative hypothesis?Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):240-248.
Vocatives.S. Predelli - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):97-105.
Vocatives.Stefano Predelli - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):97–105.

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References found in this work

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Searle - 1969 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (1):59-61.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
On saying that.Donald Davidson - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):130-146.
Meaning.Stephen Schiffer - 1972 - Philosophy 51 (195):102-109.

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