A built-in objection against if-I-were-a-horse argument

Abstract

Max Gluckman introduces us to if-I-were-a-horse arguments, but what is wrong with them? In this paper, I draw attention to an objection built-in to the terminology.

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Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

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