Folk psychology and cognitive architecture

Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96 (1995)
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It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science



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