What price neurophilosophy?

Philosophy of Science Association 1:461-68 (1992)
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A premise in the recent eliminativist arguments of Paul and Patricia Churchland is the power of connectionist-type models to solve problems facing cognitive science. I argue that their demonstrations of this power do not challenge folk psychology. Implicit in the Churchlands' arguments is the premise that folk psychology will fail to reduce to neuroscience. In the remainder of the paper I argue that just as the failure of classical genetics to reduce to molecular genetics does not suggest the elimination of classical genetics, so the possible future failure of folk psychology to reduce to neuroscience would not of itself argue for the elimination of folk psychology



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Eric Saidel
George Washington University

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