Abstract

The dissertation presents an interpretation of how Kant's concept of the duties of virtue should be understood, and what the role of such duties is in a moral theory in which the categorical imperative is held to be the fundamental moral principle. Arguments are put forward to show that the duties of virtue have an important place in Kant's moral theory and should be conceived of as more than merely a part of the imperfect duties that are implied by the categorical imperative. The duties of virtue specifically serve to clarify the motivational character of the Kantian agent and to provide a more complete understanding of the categorical imperative. ;The examination of the significance of these virtues yields an important conclusion. A standard objection to Kant's theory is that the emphasis on the formal and impartial categorical imperative does not reflect the realities involved in moral decision-making. Critics claim that the agent's personal concerns and commitments are denied by Kant as meaningful considerations in the determination of action. The dissertation puts forward a defence against this objection by arguing for a particular interpretation of Kant's theory. This interpretation is one in which the duties of virtue are conceived of as expressing Kant's recognition of the importance of the agent's personal ends in moral action. The essential position that is argued for in the dissertation is that a proper understanding of Kant's moral theory is not possible without taking into account the special role of the duties of virtue in it