Abstract

My dissertation examines Kant's theory of virtue. It is in the first instance an analysis of Kant's two accounts of virtue for the purpose of formulating a unified Kantian theory of virtue. My intention, however, is not simply to argue for a particular interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy but also to present a credible theory of virtue grounded in Kant's ethical theory without treating the Kantian text as inviolable. My dissertation is thus not only an interpretation of Kant's ethics from an unusual perspective but also an exposition of a Kantian theory of virtue that avoids certain of the weaknesses I find in Kant's ethical theory as it is usually understood. ;Kant's moral familiar account of virtue is located in the discussion of the moral worth of actions in the Groundwork. The second account appears primarily in the Doctrine of Virtue. On this latter account, one acts virtuously by fulfilling the duties of virtue . But it is questionable whether duty is the appropriate motive for acts of beneficence, gratitude, etc. The problem, then, is to reconcile Kant's claim that morally worthy actions are done from the motive of duty with his account of duties that are properly done only from some altruistic emotion like sympathy or gratitude. ;Drawing on Kant's account of virtue found in the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, I argue that virtuous persons are willing to fulfill all of their juridical duties simply because they are duties, but they will also have developed certain virtuous character traits which will motivate them to fulfill the duties of virtue. It is therefore possible to be both conscientious and also benevolent, sympathetic, etc. ;Finally, I argue that the principle of humanity requires us to respect the autonomy of persons and that it is possible to use this principle to derive the duties of love as well as the juridical duties and the specific duties of respect