Alexander of Aphrodisias [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 58 (4):919-920 (2005)
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Abstract

The text argues against the Stoics that the soul is incorporeal and is not in a subject. Pages 127–50 of the Greek text are concerned with vision and reject the different theories of the pre-Socratics. The last part explains how seeing comes about according to Aristotle. Alexander then passes to a study of man’s basic inclinations and of virtue, correcting views of the Stoa. With thirty-seven arguments he shows that virtue alone is not enough for happiness and also reminds the reader that female and male are not different species. The closing sections on luck and fate are preceded by an interesting consideration of what depends on us, that is, those things about which we deliberate. The paragraph on luck sets forth Aristotle’s doctrine of Physics 2; the pages on fate bring together material from Alexander’s De fato: what is in accordance with fate is in accordance with nature.

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