Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):277-293 (2020)

Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch the account of virtue that we think most amenable to virtue measurement. Our account integrates Whole Trait Theory from psychology with a broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue. Our account is ‘ecumenical’ in that it has appeal for a wide range of virtue ethicists. According to WTT, a personality trait is composed of a set of situation-specific trait-appropriate responses, which are produced when certain “social-cognitive” mechanisms are triggered by the perception of trait-relevant stimuli in a person’s external and/or internal environment. Moving from this starting point, we discuss our conception of a virtue and respects in which it both aligns with and diverges from Aristotle’s conception. We discuss roles for practical wisdom and motivation in our conception of virtue, and highlight respects in which WTT provides an amenable empirical framework into which key Aristotelian elements can be integrated. We conclude with brief remarks about our conception as an empirically adequate and measurable account.
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-019-10050-6
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References found in this work BETA

Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Ethics with Aristotle.Sarah Broadie - 1991 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

What is a Science of Virtue?Nancy E. Snow - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Education:1-15.

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