What are we frightened of?

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):165 – 198 (1982)
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I am concerned to understand that relation to a situation which we call fearing it. Some say this cannot be done: it is a brute fact about us that we fear certain things and we understand another's fear when we see that he confronts a situation of this sort (a basic fear object) or one which he understandably associates with this sort. In Section I, I argue that being associated with a basic fear object will not usefully explain a current fear. In Section II, I argue that the obvious candidates for being basic fears will not do the required work. The notion should be rejected. I then argue that to fear an object is to take it as exhibiting one's lack of control and I proceed to describe the nature and content of this notion



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Skepticism about weakness of will.Gary Watson - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.

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