Otto Said that I am a Fool: Sententialism, Indexicals and Kaplanian Monsters

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2):172-191 (2021)
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Abstract

According to sententialism, ‘Otto said that I am a fool’ expresses the holding of a relation between Otto and the sentence ‘I am a fool’. Sententialism is generally considered doomed, but I will show that a suitably developed sententialist account can surmount the many objections that have been raised. I will also show how important it is to have a fairer attitude towards sententialism. For if sententialist accounts are recognised as real options, it should also be recognised that the conclusion, drawn by many, that sentences such as the report above force us to introduce Kaplanian monsters is unwarranted.

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Giulia Felappi
University of Southampton

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References found in this work

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Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.

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