Year:

  1. Butler's Stone.John J. Tilley - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4): 891–909.
    Early in the eleventh of his Fifteen Sermons, Joseph Butler advances his best-known argument against psychological hedonism. Elliott Sober calls that argument Butler’s stone, and famously objects to it. I consider whether Butler’s stone has philosophical value. In doing so I examine, and reject, two possible ways of overcoming Sober’s objection, each of which has proponents. In examining the first way I discuss Lord Kames’s version of the stone argument, which has hitherto escaped scholarly attention. Finally, I show that Butler’s (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  87
    You're Probably Not Really A Speciesist.Travis Timmerman - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):683-701.
    I defend the bold claim that self-described speciesists are not really speciesists. Of course, I do not deny that self-described speciesists would assent to generic speciesist claims (e.g. Humans matter more than animals). The conclusion I draw is more nuanced. My claim is that such generic speciesist beliefs are inconsistent with other, more deeply held, beliefs of self-described speciesists. Crucially, once these inconsistencies are made apparent, speciesists will reject the generic speciesist beliefs because they are absurd by the speciesists’ own (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Thisnesses, Propositions, and Truth.David Ingram - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):442-463.
    Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, should accept a thisness ontology, since it can do considerable work in defence of presentism. In this paper, I propose a version of presentism that involves thisnesses of past and present entities and I argue this view solves important problems facing standard versions of presentism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason.Markus Kohl - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):489-516.
    Many commentators hold that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant also posits an objective law of non-moral practical rationality, 'the' Hypothetical Imperative. On this view, the appeal to the Hypothetical Imperative increases the dialectical options that Kantians have vis-a-vis Humean skepticism about the authority of reason, and it allows for a systematic explanation of the possibility of non-moral weakness of will. I argue that despite its appeal, this interpretation cannot be sustained: for Kant the only objective, universally (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  10
    Skepticism About Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.John W. Robison - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):555-577.
    This article rejects Gideon Rosen's skeptical argument that attributions of blameworthiness are never epistemically justified. Granting Rosen's controversial claim that an act is blameworthy only if it is either akratic or the causal upshot of some akratic act, I show that we can and should resist his skeptical conclusion. I show, first, that Rosen's argument is, at best, hostage to a much more global skepticism about attributions of praiseworthiness, doxastic justification, and other phenomena which essentially involve causal‐historical facts about mental (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  41
    Kant's Conceptualism: A New Reading of the Transcendental Deduction.Justin B. Shaddock - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):464-488.
    I defend a novel interpretation of Kant's conceptualism regarding the contents of our perceptual experiences. Conceptualist interpreters agree that Kant's Deduction aims to prove that intuitions require the categories for their spatiality and temporality. But conceptualists disagree as to which features of space and time make intuitions require the categories. Interpreters have cited the singularity, unity, infinity, and homogeneity of space and time. But this is incompatible with Kant's Aesthetic, which aims to prove that these same features qualify space and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Philosophical Arguments Against the A-Theory.Daniel Deasy - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):270-292.
    According to the A-theory of time some instant of time is absolutely present. Many reject the A-theory on the grounds that it is inconsistent with current spacetime physics, which appears to leave no room for absolute presentness. However, some reject the A-theory on purely philosophical grounds. In this article I describe three purely philosophical arguments against the A-theory and show that there are plausible A-theoretic responses to each of them. I conclude that, whatever else is wrong with the A-theory, it (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):174-185.
    Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  93
    Emergence for Nihilists.Richard L. J. Caves - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):2-28.
    I defend mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, against a challenge from ontological emergence, the view that some things have properties that are ‘something over and above’ the properties of their parts. As the nihilist does not believe in composite wholes, there is nothing in the nihilist's ontology to instantiate emergent properties – or so the challenge goes. However, I argue that some simples can collectively instantiate an emergent property, so the nihilist's ontology can in fact (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139.
    Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. Do Intentions Set Up Rational Defaults? Commitments, Reasons, and the Diachronic Dimension of Rationality.Jens Gillessen - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):29-64.
    Suppose that you do not do what you have previously decided to do. Are you to be charged with irrationality? A number of otherwise divergent theories of practical rationality hold that by default, you are; there are rational pressures, it is claimed, that favor the long-term stability and eventual execution of distal intentions. The article challenges this view by examining how these purported pressures can be spelled out. Is intention a normative commitment to act? Are intentions reasons for action – (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  41
    Human Nature and Moral Sprouts: Mencius on the Pollyanna Problem.Richard T. Kim - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):140-162.
    This article responds to a common criticism of Aristotelian naturalism known as the Pollyanna Problem, the objection that Aristotelian naturalism, when combined with recent empirical research, generates morally unacceptable conclusions. In developing a reply to this objection, I draw upon the conception of human nature developed by the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, and build up an account of ethical naturalism that provides a satisfying response to the Pollyanna Problem while also preserving what is most attractive about Aristotelian naturalism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View.Michael Moehler - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):82-99.
    Central to the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute is the question of whether the core modeling device of Rawls' theory of justice, the original position, justifies Rawls' principles of justice, as Rawls suggests, or whether it justifies the average utility principle, as Harsanyi suggests. Many commentators agree with Harsanyi and consider this dispute to be primarily about the correct application of normative decision theory to Rawls' original position. I argue that, if adequately conceived, the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute is not primarily a dispute about the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What is Said.Andrew Peet - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):65-81.
    This article discusses the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the content of assertions in order to gain testimonial knowledge? There is a brief discussion of why this issue is of importance, followed by two counterexamples to the most intuitive answer: that in order for an audience to gain testimonial knowledge that p they must know that the speaker has asserted p. It is then suggested that the argument generalises and can be made to work on different (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  96
    Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism.William S. Robinson - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):100-117.
    Contemporaries often reject epiphenomenalism out of hand, while Russellian Monism is regarded as worthy of further development. It is argued here that this difference of attitudes is indefensible, because the easy rejection of EPI is due to its violating a certain Causal Intuition, and RM implicitly violates that same intuition. An enriched version of RM mitigates the violation, but the same mitigation results if we make a parallel enrichment of EPI. If RM and EPI are approached on a level playing (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16.  11
    On the Asymmetry Between Twin Earth and Inverted Earth.Hagit Benbaji - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):137-150.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  6
    The Nurturing Stance: Making Sense of Responsibility Without Blame.Daphne Brandenburg - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):5-22.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  22
    Visual Feeling of Presence.Gabriele Ferretti - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):112-136.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  19.  1
    Reid's Non-Humean Theory of Moral Motives.Esther Engels Kroeker - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):205-224.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility.Alex Madva - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):53-78.
    Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious, ‘introspectively inaccessible’ attitudes. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence of partial awareness for individuals’ moral responsibility. First, I argue that responsibility comes in degrees. Second, I argue that individuals’ partial awareness of their implicit biases makes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21.  13
    Spinoza's Formal Mechanism.Christopher Martin - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):151-181.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275.
    Norman forms the belief that the president is in New York by way of a clairvoyance faculty he doesn’t know he has. Many agree that his belief is unjustified but disagree about why it is unjustified. I argue that the lack of justification cannot be explained by a higher-level evidence requirement on justification, but it can be explained by a no-defeater requirement. I then explain how you can use cognitive faculties you don’t know you have. Lastly, I use lessons from (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23.  3
    Cogency, Warrant Transmission-Increase and Non-Ideal Thinkers.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):23-43.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  49
    The Compatibility of the Structure-and-Dynamics Argument and Phenomenal Functionalism About Space.Luke Roelofs - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):44-52.
    Chalmers (2002) argues against physicalism in part using the premise that no truth about consciousness can be deduced a priori from any set of purely structural truths. Chalmers (2012) elaborates a detailed definition of what it is for a truth to be structural, which turns out to include spatiotemporal truths. But Chalmers (2012) then proposes to define spatiotemporal terms by reference to their role in causing spatial and temporal experiences. Stoljar (2015) and Ebbers (Ms) argue that this definition of spatiotemporal (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  32
    Flat Emergence.Olivier Sartenaer - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):225-250.
    The main contention of this article is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to emergence. In this article, I devise an alternative perspective on ontological emergence called ‘flat emergence’, which is free of such a bias. The motivation is twofold: not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  5
    Virtue Ethics is Empirically Adequate: A Defense of the Caps Response to Situationism.Ryan West - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):79-111.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27.  10
    The Realization of Qualia, Persons, and Artifacts.Ben White - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):182-204.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Rethinking the Principle of Fair Play.Justin Tosi - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (99):612-631.
    The principle of fair play is widely thought to require simply that costs and benefits be distributed fairly. This gloss on the principle, while not entirely inaccurate, has invited a host of popular objections based on misunderstandings about fair play. Central to many of these objections is a failure to treat the principle of fair play as a transactional principle—one that allocates special obligations and rights among persons as a result of their interactions. I offer an interpretation of the principle (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  21
    Putting the Ghost Back in the Machine: An Exploration of Somatic Dualism.Matthew Davidson - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, I explore various views on which mind-body dualism is true, but the soul is located in the body. I argue that this sort of dualism (which I call 'somatic dualism') once was a not-uncommon view in the philosophy of mind. I also argue that it has the resources to reply to some of the problems thought to affect Cartesian dualism.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues