Abstract

In this paper I will bring into consideration the controversy betweenHusserl and Natorp dealing with the accurate meaning of the psychological reflectionand, altogether with that issue, how the phenomenological activityshould be assumed. I will try to present the legitimacy of some of the criticswhich Natorp and Husserl make to each other. This will lead us to a pointwhere we will be confronted with a major problem which is posed on us: the elucidation of the concrete sense of the phenomenological activity.En este artículo se considera someramente la controversia entre Husserl yNatorp relativa al sentido de la reflexión psicológica y, con ello, de la actividadfenomenológica. Trataré de presentar la legitimidad de las críticas que Husserly Natorp se hacen respectivamente. Eso llevará a indicar una tarea que sigueimponiéndosenos todavía: la dilucidación del concreto sentido del quehacerfenomenológico