Is Temporality Mind-Dependent?

Abstract
A distinction is made between the indexicality theme and the elapsive theme. The first theme is concerned with the question of whether nowness and other irreducibly indexical A-determinations are mind-dependent or not. It is argued that there are no such A-determinations, within or outside of mind. The second, elapsive theme, which is often not distinguished from the first, deals with whether or not non-indexical felt transiency or elapsiveness is mind-dependent. Four arguments for the mind-dependence of "temporal becoming" are assessed as they apply to these two kinds of temporal becoming.
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