Could there be a theory of perception?

Journal of Philosophy 63 (June):369-380 (1966)
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Keywords Epistemology  Perception  Psychology  Recognition  Ryle, G
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X  
DOI 10.2307/2024283
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Wittgensteinian Philosophy and Empirical Psychology.Richard Rorty - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (3):151 - 172.
Zur Möglichkeit Kognitiver Psychologie Aus Wittgensteinscher Sicht.W. P. Mendonça - 1987 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 18 (1-2):183-203.
Zur Möglichkeit kognitiver Psychologie aus Wittgensteinscher Sicht.W. P. Mendonça - 1987 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 18 (1-2):183-203.

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