Hume on Moral Judgement

In Virtues and vices. Wiley-Blackwell (1997)
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Abstract

David Hume's view of virtue as agreeable and useful differs from the views of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Jean Jacques Rousseau who see virtue as sublime and noble. Hume does not differentiate between virtues, skills, and talents that, as such, all arouse approbation or pleasing sentiments in others. Hume's view commits him to subjectivism in his theory of ethics.

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10.1093/0199252866.003.0005

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Citations of this work

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Moral appearances: emotions, robots, and human morality. [REVIEW]Mark Coeckelbergh - 2010 - Ethics and Information Technology 12 (3):235-241.
Toward a Humean Virtue Ethics.Lorenzo Greco - 2012 - In Julia Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective. New York: Routledge. pp. 210-23.

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