Moralistic Fallacy

In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 371–373 (2018-05-09)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: the moralistic fallacy. The moralistic fallacy occurs when one concludes that something is a particular way because it should or ought to be that way. Alternatively, this fallacy occurs when one concludes that something cannot be a particular way because it should not or ought not be that way. The moralistic fallacy is often described as the reverse of the is/ought fallacy, wherein one reasons fallaciously that because things are a particular way, they ought to be that way. Variations of the moralistic fallacy occur whenever any normative claim is used to justify a factual claim about the world, and so the pattern of fallacious reason central to the moralistic fallacy can also be found in legal reasoning, prudential reasoning, or reasoning regarding proper etiquette, aesthetics, humor, or appropriate emotional responses.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,891

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The moralistic fallacy.Edward C. Moore - 1957 - Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):29-42.
The Moralistic Fallacy.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the “Appropriateness” of Emotions.Justin D’Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
Argument from Fallacy.Christian Cotton - 2018-05-09 - In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 125–127.
Essentializing.Jack Bowen - 2018-05-09 - In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 149–151.
Special Pleading.Dan Yim - 2018-05-09 - In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 219–222.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
7 (#1,405,108)

6 months
4 (#1,005,419)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Galen Foresman
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references