Abstract
A major objective of cognitive science is to understand the nature of the abstract representations and computational processes responsible for our ability to reason, speak, perceive, and interact with the world. In addition, a commitment to a materialist resolution of the mind–body problem requires that we search for the manner in which these representations and processes are neurally instantiated in the brain. Given this dual aim, one might proceed in one of two ways: (1) from the bottom up, commencing with the study of how low‐level information and computations are encoded in the neuroanatomy of the brain, in the hope of working upwards toward an understanding of the properties of higher‐level cognitive processes; (2) from the top down, using behavioral data from a variety of sources to provide an abstract characterization of cognitive processes and then utilizing these results to guide our search for the neural mechanisms of cognition. At present, our understanding of the neural basis of higher‐level cognition is virtually negligible. Thus, it is probably fair to say that a contemporary study of any of the domains discussed in part II of this volume may be carried out only in a top‐down fashion.