Atemporality and the mode of divine knowledge

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (3):171 - 180 (1993)
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Abstract

In this project, I explore and defend William Alston's claim that God does not have beliefs. Rather, He knows what He knows by direct intuition of facts. This direct intuition is absolute immediate awareness. It is immediate in that God knows what He knows without the mediation of other objects of knowledge. It is absolute in that His knowledge is not mediated by any other factors such as causal links between the object of knowledge and God's consciousness of it. ;My central argument is that if God knows all facts by direct intuitive awareness, He must be atemporal. If God is temporal, He could not have direct intuitive awareness of past or future facts. This is because absolute immediate awareness cannot span time. A knowing subject who is temporal can have direct intuitive awareness only of those facts which are temporally present. ;My argument that direct intuitive awareness cannot span time focusses on God's experience of a temporal now. A temporal God will experience what is happening now in a manner which is different than His experience of the past or the future. I argue that God's cognitive experience of past or future facts must be mediated in some way. If this is the case, it is not absolute immediate awareness. Therefore, a temporal God can have direct intuitive awareness only of present facts. In order to have direct intuitive awareness of all facts, regardless of their temporal locations, God must be atemporal

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