Abstract
In his introduction to the General Concept of the Logic, Hegel writes: “What propels the concept onward is the already mentioned negative which it possesses in itself; it is this that constitutes the truly dialectical factor.” Negation is typically regarded as the fundamental engine of Hegel’s Science of Logic and for good reason. I call this the common thesis, although its hues are many. The method can be described as a ‘triplicity of negation’, consisting of (i) content, (ii) negation, and (iii) negation of the negation, or speculative identity. In this article, I defend an interpretation that both affirms and rejects the common thesis. I argue that negation is both central to, yet ultimately wrongly identified as the “engine” of the Logic. I argue that to understand Hegel’s logic of negation, we must keep clearly in view what Hegel calls the scientific status of the Logic, the opening moment of the Logic, and to the concluding moment of negation in the logic of the Idea. I engage with Henrich, Pippin, Brandom, Bowman, and Ng.