Abstract

In this paper, I discuss observations on when given by Sandström (1993) for constructions of the form ‘When A B’, where A and B both describe events (as opposed to states). Sandströ m proposes that for events described in the simple past, the temporal interpretation of such sequences varies according to whether A describes a culminated process (CP)(accomplishment) or a culmination (CULM)(roughly, an achievement). She offers an account of this behaviour based on the claim that culminations denote changes of state while culminated processes do not. I argue that this claim is unmotivated, and in addition, draw attention to a range of counterexamples to her generalisation. I present an analysis which is not based on the CP/CULM distinction but relies instead on the distinction originally proposed by Dowty (1979) between the event structures CAUSE-BECOME and BECOME. I show that this distinction is closely related to whether the event has a prototypical agent. It is therefore thematic structure rather than temporal structure that determines the behaviour of when in these cases