Perspectives on Science 13 (1):49-73 (2005)
: This paper offers a preliminary analysis of conceptual change between event concepts. It begins with a brief review of the major findings of cognitive studies on event knowledge. The script model proposed by Schank and Abelson was the first attempt to represent event knowledge. Subsequent cognitive studies indicated that event knowledge is organized in the form of dimensional organizations in which temporally successive actions are related causally. This paper proposes a frame representation to capture and outline the internal structure of event concepts, in particular, their causal connections. The frame representation offers an effective method to analyze the relations between event concepts, and to expose the unique cognitive mechanisms behind conceptual change involved event concepts. Finally this paper shows that the frame representation of event concepts is instrumental to understanding an important historical episode of conceptual change in the context of nineteenth-century optics.
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References found in this work BETA
Women, Fire and Dangerous Thing: What Catergories Reveal About the Mind.George Lakoff - 1987 - University of Chicago Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Peter Barker - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (3):445-465.
The Object Bias and the Study of Scientific Revolutions: Lessons From Developmental Psychology.Xiang Chen - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):479 – 503.
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