Harvard University Press (1986)

Authors
Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
So argues a leading epistemologist in this work of fundamental importance to philosophical thinking.
Keywords Cognition  Knowledge, Theory of  Cognition  Philosophy
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Reprint years 1989
Call number BF311.G582 1986
ISBN(s) 0674258967   9780674258969  
DOI 10.2307/2185025
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.

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