What will they say?—Public Announcement Games

Synthese 179 (S1):57 - 85 (2011)
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Abstract

Dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible information-changing actions available to individual agents, and their knowledge pre-and post conditions. For example, public announcement logic describes actions in the form of public, truthful announcements. However, little research so far has considered describing and analysing rational choice between such actions, i.e., predicting what rational self-interested agents actually will or should do. Since the outcome of information exchange ultimately depends on the actions chosen by all the agents in the system, and assuming that agents have preferences over such outcomes, this is a game theoretic scenario. This is, in our opinion, an interesting general research direction, combining logic and game theory in the study of rational information exchange. In this article we take some first steps in this direction: we consider the case where available actions are public announcements, and where each agent has a (typically epistemic) goal formula that she would like to become true. What will each agent announce? The truth of the goal formula also depends on the announcements made by other agents. We analyse such public announcement games

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Citations of this work

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Reasoning About Preference Dynamics.Fenrong Liu - 2011 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.
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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Logics of public communications.Jan Plaza - 2007 - Synthese 158 (2):165 - 179.
An essay in modal logic.G. H. von Wright - 1951 - Amsterdam,: North-Holland Pub. Co..

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