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Summary Epistemic logics are logics that allow one to reason about knowledge in some way. Doxastic logics are similar, but allow one to reason about belief rather than knowledge. The languages of these logics contain knowledge or belief operators or predicates, governed by appropriate axioms or rules. (Just what axioms and rules are appropriate is a controversial matter, however.) Many epistemic and doxastic logics are modal logics, whose languages contains one or more knowledge or belief operators, and whose semantics is given in terms of relational Kripke models. In such models, the points or states can be thought of as epistemically (or doxastically) possible worlds, related to one another by epistemic (or doxastic) accessibility relations. This modal approach to epistemic and doxastic logic has been widely adopted in formal logic, philosophy, computer science, artificial intelligence, economics and game theory. The category doxastic logic also includes work on belief revision and belief update, which addresses the question: how should an agent revise or update its beliefs, on receiving conflicting information?
Key works Modern epistemic logic began with Hintikka 1962, who developed Kripke-style semantics for epistemic notions and discussed appropriate axioms for knowledge and belief. Hintikka proposes a solution to the logical omniscience problem, whereby agents are treated as automatically knowing all consequences of what they know, in Hintikka 1975. Hintikka's approach is developed and applied to problems in computer science in Fagin et al 1995. The leading theory of belief revision, the ‘AGM’ theory, was first presented in Alchourrón et al 1985
Introductions Hintikka 1962 is a great introduction to epistemic and doxastic logics; Hendricks 2008 briefly surveys the area. Huber 2013 introduces and discusses AGM theories of belief revision.
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  1. added 2020-04-05
    Introduzione alle Logiche Modali.Marcello Frixione, Samuele Iaquinto & Massimiliano Vignolo - 2016 - Roma-Bari: Laterza.
    La logica modale è nata per studiare i ragionamenti su ciò che è possibile e ciò che è necessario. Negli ultimi decenni, a partire dal lavoro di logici e filosofi quali Rudolf Carnap, Saul Kripke e David Lewis, la sua applicazione è stata progressivamente estesa ad altri ambiti, quali il ragionamento sul tempo, sulla conoscenza e sui sistemi di norme. Queste ricerche hanno condotto a un complesso e intrigante dialogo con alcune fondamentali branche della filosofia: la metafisica, l’epistemologia, la filosofia (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-20
    Imagining Stories: Attitudes and Operators.Neil Van Leeuwen - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    This essay argues that there are theoretical benefits to keeping distinct—more pervasively than the literature has done so far—the psychological states of imagining that p versus believing that in-the-story p, when it comes to cognition of fiction and other forms of narrative. Positing both in the minds of a story’s audience helps explain the full range of reactions characteristic of story consumption. This distinction also has interesting conceptual and explanatory dimensions that haven’t been carefully observed, and the two mental state (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-10
    A Logic for Factive Ignorance.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of φ, then φ is true. In the present article, we first (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-10
    Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic.Wesley Holliday - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. Springer.
    Epistemic logic in the tradition of Hintikka provides, as one of its many applications, a toolkit for the precise analysis of certain epistemological problems. In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has expanded this toolkit. Dynamic epistemic logic has been used in analyses of well-known epistemic “paradoxes”, such as the Paradox of the Surprise Examination and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, and related epistemic phenomena, such as what Hintikka called the “anti-performatory effect” of Moorean announcements. In this paper, we explore a variation (...)
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  5. added 2020-03-10
    Partiality and Adjointness in Modal Logic.Wesley H. Holliday - 2014 - In Rajeev Goré, Barteld Kooi & Agi Kurucz (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic, Volume 10. CSLI Publications. pp. 313-332.
    Following a proposal of Humberstone, this paper studies a semantics for modal logic based on partial “possibilities” rather than total “worlds.” There are a number of reasons, philosophical and mathematical, to find this alternative semantics attractive. Here we focus on the construction of possibility models with a finitary flavor. Our main completeness result shows that for a number of standard modal logics, we can build a canonical possibility model, wherein every logically consistent formula is satisfied, by simply taking each individual (...)
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  6. added 2020-03-10
    A Uniform Logic of Information Dynamics.Wesley H. Holliday, Tomohiro Hoshi & Thomas F. Icard Iii - 2012 - In Thomas Bolander, Torben Braüner, Silvio Ghilardi & Lawrence Moss (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic, Volume 9. CSLI Publications. pp. 348-367.
    Unlike standard modal logics, many dynamic epistemic logics are not closed under uniform substitution. A distinction therefore arises between the logic and its substitu- tion core, the set of formulas all of whose substitution instances are valid. The classic example of a non-uniform dynamic epistemic logic is Public Announcement Logic (PAL), and a well-known open problem is to axiomatize the substitution core of PAL. In this paper we solve this problem for PAL over the class of all relational models with (...)
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  7. added 2020-02-07
    Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to (...)
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  8. added 2020-01-07
    Reducing Contrastive Knowledge.Michael Cohen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    According to one form of epistemic contrastivism, due to Jonathan Schaffer, knowledge is not a binary relation between an agent and a proposition, but a ternary relation between an agent, a proposition, and a context-basing question. In a slogan: to know is to know the answer to a question. I argue, first, that Schaffer-style epistemic contrastivism can be semantically represented in inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic, a recent implementation of inquisitive semantics in the framework of dynamic epistemic logic; second, that within (...)
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  9. added 2019-11-05
    Quantum Information Versus Epistemic Logic: An Analysis of the Frauchiger–Renner Theorem.Florian J. Boge - 2019 - Foundations of Physics 49 (10):1143-1165.
    A recent no-go theorem (Frauchiger and Renner in Nat Commun 9(1):3711, 2018) establishes a contradiction from a specific application of quantum theory to a multi- agent setting. The proof of this theorem relies heavily on notions such as ‘knows’ or ‘is certain that’. This has stimulated an analysis of the theorem by Nurgalieva and del Rio (in: Selinger P, Chiribella G (eds) Proceedings of the 15th international conference on quantum physics and logic (QPL 2018). EPTCS 287, Open Publishing Association, Waterloo, (...)
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  10. added 2019-09-26
    Issues in Epistemic and Modal Logics and Their Applications.Cezar A. Mortari - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Tübingen
  11. added 2019-09-23
    Moore's Paradox and the Logic of Belief.Andrés Páez - manuscript
  12. added 2019-09-19
    Realistics Premises of Epistemic Argumentation for Dynamic Epistemic Logics.Edward Bryniarski, Zbigniew Bonikowski, Jacek Waldmajer & Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2011 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 23 (36).
    In the paper, certain rational postulates for protocols describing real communicating are introduced.These rational postulates, on the one hand, allow assigning a certain typology of real systems of interactions, which is consistent with the reality of epistemic argumentation in systems of communicating, and on the other one – defining rules of using argumentation in real situations. Moreover, the presented postulates for protocols characterize information networks and administering knowledge in real interactivity systems. Due to the epistemic character of the considerations, the (...)
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  13. added 2019-09-18
    Indicative Conditionals Without Iterative Epistemology.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper argues that two widely accepted principles about the indicative conditional jointly presuppose the falsity of one of the most prominent arguments against epistemological iteration principles. The first principle about the indicative conditional, which has close ties both to the Ramsey test and the “or-to-if” inference, says that knowing a material conditional suffices for knowing the corresponding indicative. The second principle says that conditional contradictions cannot be true when their antecedents are epistemically possible. Taken together, these principles entail that (...)
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  14. added 2019-09-17
    Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should impact our beliefs, it is less clear how and (...)
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  15. added 2019-09-16
    Bayesianism for Non-Ideal Agents.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Orthodox Bayesianism is a highly idealized theory of how we ought to live our epistemic lives. One of the most widely discussed idealizations is that of logical omniscience: the assumption that an agent’s degrees of belief must be probabilistically coherent to be rational. It is widely agreed that this assumption is problematic if we want to reason about bounded rationality, logical learning, or other aspects of non-ideal epistemic agency. Yet, we still lack a satisfying way to avoid logical omniscience within (...)
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  16. added 2019-09-13
    Explicitní/implicitní přesvědčení a derivační systémy [Explicit/Implicit Belief and Derivation Systems].Jiri Raclavsky & Ivo Pezlar - 2019 - Filosoficky Casopis 67 (1): 89-120.
    The problem of hyperintensional contexts, and the problem of logical omniscience, shows the severe limitation of possible-worlds semantics which is employed also in standard epistemic logic. As a solution, we deploy here hyperintensional semantics according to which the meaning of an expression is an abstract structured algorithm, namely Tichý's construction. Constructions determine the denotata of expressions. Propositional attitudes are modelled as attitudes towards constructions of truth values. Such a model of belief is, of course, inferentially restrictive. We therefore also propose (...)
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  17. added 2019-09-13
    The Typing Approach to Church-Fitch's Knowability Paradox and its Revenge Form.Jiri Raclavsky - 2018 - Prolegomena 17 (1):31-49.
    Williamson, Linsky, Paseau and others proposed a solution to Church- Fitch's knowability paradox that is based on typing knowledge; however, it received some criticism. Carrara and Fassio objected that the approach has no paradox-independent motivation, it is thus ad hoc. In the first part of the paper, I dismiss such criticism by carefully stating typing approach principles that are based on non-circular formation of propositions and intensional operators operating on them. In the second part of the paper, I demonstrate that (...)
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  18. added 2019-09-10
    Two Tales of Epistemic Models.Yang Liu - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):291-302.
    This short paper has two parts. First, we prove a generalisation of Aumann's surprising impossibility result in the context of rational decision making. We then move, in the second part, to discuss the interpretational meaning of some formal setups of epistemic models, and we do so by means of presenting an interesting puzzle in epistemic logic. The aim is to highlight certain problematic aspects of these epistemic systems concerning first/third-person asymmetry which underlies both parts of the story. This asymmetry, we (...)
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  19. added 2019-09-03
    Epistemic Logic Without Closure.Stephan Leuenberger & Martin Smith - forthcoming - Synthese.
    All standard epistemic logics legitimate something akin to the principle of closure, according to which knowledge is closed under competent deductive inference. And yet the principle of closure, particularly in its multiple premise guise, has a somewhat ambivalent status within epistemology. One might think that serious concerns about closure point us away from epistemic logic altogether—away from the very idea that the knowledge relation could be fruitfully treated as a kind of modal operator. This, however, need not be so. The (...)
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  20. added 2019-07-29
    De dynamische wending in de epistemische logica [The Dynamic Turn in Epistemic Logic].Lorenz Demey - 2016 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 78 (2):365-391.
    This article describes the historical development of epistemic logic, focusing on the dynamic turn that has taken place in the last few decades. Although this dynamic turn was mainly motivated by technical considerations in computer science and game theory, it is argued that it can also be relevant from a more philosophical perspective: the application of dynamic epistemic logics to analyze prima facie static notions, theorems, etc. fits perfectly in a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy as conceptual elucidation. Furthermore, it turns (...)
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  21. added 2019-07-29
    Some Remarks on the Model Theory of Epistemic Plausibility Models.Lorenz6 Demey - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (3-4):375-395.
    The aim of this paper is to initiate a systematic exploration of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models (EPMs). There are two subtly different definitions in the literature: one by van Benthem and one by Baltag and Smets. Because van Benthem's notion is the most general, most of the paper is dedicated to this notion. We focus on the notion of bisimulation, and show that the most natural generalization of bisimulation to van Benthem-type EPMs fails. We then introduce parametrized (...)
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  22. added 2019-07-20
    When Do Introspection Axioms Matter for Multi-Agent Epistemic Reasoning?Wesley H. Holliday, Yifeng Ding & Cedegao Zhang - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:121–139.
    The early literature on epistemic logic in philosophy focused on reasoning about the knowledge or belief of a single agent, especially on controversies about "introspection axioms" such as the 4 and 5 axioms. By contrast, the later literature on epistemic logic in computer science and game theory has focused on multi-agent epistemic reasoning, with the single-agent 4 and 5 axioms largely taken for granted. In the relevant multi-agent scenarios, it is often important to reason about what agent A believes about (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    On Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience.William J. Rapaport & Moshe Y. Vardi - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):668.
    Review of Joseph Y. Halpern (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference (Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1986),.
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  24. added 2019-06-05
    On the Factivity of Implicit Intersubjective Knowledge.Alessandro Giordani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1909-1923.
    The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that are explicitly (...)
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  25. added 2019-03-09
    Règles de logique, Règles de discours. La pragmatique de la connaissance selon Hintikka.Fabien Schang - 2018 - Klesis 39:92-124.
    L’article qui suit a pour but de présenter un des aspects centraux de la contribution philosophique de Jaakko Hintikka : l’épistémologie formelle. Le thème choisi, le Paradoxe de Moore, permettra d’illustrer le mot d’ordre de la philosophie formelle, celui d’utiliser des outils logiques en vue de la clarification de problèmes philosophiques. Il s’agit également de mettre en évidence la nature pragmatique du discours épistémique, qui transparaît dans les résultats sémantiques de Hintikka et parle en faveur de la logique illocutoire.
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  26. added 2019-03-09
    Une sémantique générale des croyances justifiées.Fabien Schang & Alexandre Costa Leite - 2016 - CLE-Prints 16 (3):1-24.
    Nous proposons une logique épistémique quadrivalente AR4.
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  27. added 2019-03-09
    How to Hintikkize a Frege.Fabien Schang - 2016 - In Amirouche Moktefi, Alessio Moretti & Fabien Schang (eds.), Let’s be Logical (Studies in the Philosophy and History of Logic). Londres, Royaume-Uni: pp. 161-172.
    The paper deals with the main contribution of the Finnish logician Jaakko Hintikka: epistemic logic, in particular the 'static' version of the system based on the formal analysis of the concepts of knowledge and belief. I propose to take a different look at this philosophical logic and to consider it from the opposite point of view of the philosophy of logic. At first, two theories of meaning are described and associated with two competing theories of linguistic competence. In a second (...)
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  28. added 2019-01-03
    Standard State Space Models of Unawareness.Peter Fritz & Harvey Lederman - 2015 - Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge 15.
    The impossibility theorem of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini has been thought to demonstrate that standard state-space models cannot be used to represent unawareness. We first show that Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini do not establish this claim. We then distinguish three notions of awareness, and argue that although one of them may not be adequately modeled using standard state spaces, there is no reason to think that standard state spaces cannot provide models of the other two notions. In fact, standard space (...)
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  29. added 2018-11-26
    Factive Knowability and the Problem of Possible Omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.
    Famously, the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In this argument, knowability is analyzed in terms of having the possibility to know. Several philosophers have objected to this analysis, because it turns knowability into a nonfactive notion. In addition, they claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience can be avoided. In this (...)
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  30. added 2018-11-05
    A Dynamic Logic of Interrogative Inquiry.Yacin Hamami - 2015 - In Can Başkent (ed.), Perspectives on Interrogative Models of Inquiry: Developments in Inquiry and Questions. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 129-161.
    We propose a dynamic-epistemic analysis of the different epistemic operations constitutive of the process of interrogative inquiry, as described by Hintikka’s Interrogative Model of Inquiry (IMI). We develop a dynamic logic of questions for representing interrogative steps, based on Hintikka’s treatment of questions in the IMI, along with a dynamic logic of inferences for representing deductive steps, based on the tableau method. We then merge these two systems into a dynamic logic of interrogative inquiry which articulates a joint treatment of (...)
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  31. added 2018-09-08
    On a Flawed Argument Against the KK Principle.S. Okasha - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):80-86.
    Externalists in epistemology often reject the KK principle – which says that if a person knows that p, then they know that they know that p. This paper argues that one standard argument against the KK principle that many externalists make is fallacious, as it involves illicit substitution into an intensional context. The fallacy is exposed and discussed.
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  32. added 2018-08-19
    Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...)
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  33. added 2018-07-16
    Impossible Worlds and Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3433-3458.
    One response to the problem of logical omniscience in standard possible worlds models of belief is to extend the space of worlds so as to include impossible worlds. It is natural to think that essentially the same strategy can be applied to probabilistic models of partial belief, for which parallel problems also arise. In this paper, I note a difficulty with the inclusion of impossible worlds into probabilistic models. Under weak assumptions about the space of worlds, most of the propositions (...)
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  34. added 2018-07-01
    Aboutness in Imagination.Franz Berto - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1871-1886.
    I present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fine’s works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmers’ positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situation—a configuration of objects and properties—verifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to (...)
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  35. added 2018-06-05
    Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief.Eric Raidl & Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (6):577-609.
    In this paper we compare Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief and Spohn’s ranking-theoretic account of belief. We discuss the two theories as solutions to the lottery paradox. To compare the two theories, we introduce a novel translation between ranking functions and probability functions. We draw some crucial consequences from this translation, in particular a new probabilistic belief notion. Based on this, we explore the logical relation between the two belief theories, showing that models of Leitgeb’s theory correspond to certain models (...)
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  36. added 2018-05-18
    The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne & Luc Bovens - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):241-264.
    John Locke proposed a straightforward relationship between qualitative and quantitative doxastic notions: belief corresponds to a sufficiently high degree of confidence. Richard Foley has further developed this Lockean thesis and applied it to an analysis of the preface and lottery paradoxes. Following Foley's lead, we exploit various versions of these paradoxes to chart a precise relationship between belief and probabilistic degrees of confidence. The resolutions of these paradoxes emphasize distinct but complementary features of coherent belief. These features suggest principles that (...)
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  37. added 2018-05-17
    Defusing the Miners Paradox.Michael J. Shaffer - 2018 - Filosofiska Notiser 5:57-67.
    This paper presents a case for the claim that the infamous miners paradox is not a paradox. This contention is based on some important observations about the nature of ignorance with respect to both disjunctions and conditional obligations and their modal features. The gist of the argument is that given the uncertainty about the location of the miners in the story and the nature of obligations, the apparent obligation to block either mine shaft is cancelled.
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  38. added 2018-04-20
    Tableaux-Based Decision Method for Single-Agent Linear Time Synchronous Temporal Epistemic Logics with Interacting Time and Knowledge.Mai Ajspur & Valentin Goranko - 2013 - In Kamal Lodaya (ed.), Logic and its Applications. Springer. pp. 80--96.
    Temporal epistemic logics are known, from results of Halpern and Vardi, to have a wide range of complexities of the satisfiability problem: from PSPACE, through non-elementary, to highly undecidable. These complexities depend on the choice of some key parameters specifying, inter alia, possible interactions between time and knowledge, such as synchrony and agents' abilities for learning and recall. In this work we develop practically implementable tableau-based decision procedures for deciding satisfiability in single-agent synchronous temporal-epistemic logics with interactions between time and (...)
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  39. added 2018-04-20
    Tableau-Based Decision Procedure for the Multiagent Epistemic Logic with All Coalitional Operators for Common and Distributed Knowledge.M. Ajspur, V. Goranko & D. Shkatov - 2013 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 21 (3):407-437.
    We develop a conceptually clear, intuitive, and feasible decision procedure for testing satisfiability in the full multi\-agent epistemic logic \CMAELCD\ with operators for common and distributed knowledge for all coalitions of agents mentioned in the language. To that end, we introduce Hintikka structures for \CMAELCD\ and prove that satisfiability in such structures is equivalent to satisfiability in standard models. Using that result, we design an incremental tableau-building procedure that eventually constructs a satisfying Hintikka structure for every satisfiable input set of (...)
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  40. added 2018-04-20
    Reasoning About Knowledge, Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses, and Moshe Y. Vardi. [REVIEW]Valentin Goranko - 1999 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):469-473.
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  41. added 2018-04-12
    A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.
    The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the laws (...)
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  42. added 2018-02-26
    Modal Epistemology.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - manuscript
    Some central epistemological notions are expressed by sentential operators O that entail the possibility of knowledge in the sense that 'Op' entails 'It is possible to know that p'. We call these modal-epistemological notions. Using apriority and being in a position to know as case studies, we argue that the logics of modal epistemological notions are extremely weak. In particular, their logics are not normal and do not include any closure principles.
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  43. added 2018-02-18
    Invitation to Autoepistemology.Lloyd Humberstone - 2002 - Theoria 68 (1):13-51.
    The phrase ‘autoepistemic logic’ was introduced in Moore [1985] to refer to a study inspired in large part by criticisms in Stalnaker [1980] of a particular nonmonotonic logic proposed by McDermott and Doyle.1 Very informative discussions for those who have not encountered this area are provided by Moore [1988] and the wide-ranging survey article Konolige [1994], and the scant remarks in the present introductory section do not pretend to serve in place of those treatments as summaries of the field. A (...)
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  44. added 2018-02-18
    Reasoning About Knowledge.Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses & Moshe Vardi - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Reasoning About Knowledge is the first book to provide a general discussion of approaches to reasoning about knowledge and its applications to distributed ...
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  45. added 2018-02-17
    On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox.Alessandro Giordani - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):597-611.
    In a recent paper, Alexander argues that relaxing the requirement that sound knowers know their own soundness might provide a solution to Fitch’s paradox and introduces a suitable axiomatic system where the paradox is avoided. In this paper an analysis of this solution is proposed according to which the effective move for solving the paradox depends on the axiomatic treatment of the ontic modality rather than the limitations imposed on the epistemic one. It is then shown that, once the ontic (...)
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  46. added 2018-02-17
    Logic For Reasoning About Knowledge.Ewa Orlowska - 1989 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 35 (6):559-572.
    One of the important issues in research on knowledge based computer systems is development of methods for reasoning about knowledge. In the present paper semantics for knowledge operators is introduced. The underlying logic is developed with epistemic operators relative to indiscernibility. Facts about knowledge expressible in the logic are discussed, in particular common knowledge and joint knowledge of n group of agents. Some paradoxes of epistemic logic are shown to be eliminated in the given system. A formal logical analysis of (...)
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  47. added 2018-02-17
    Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
  48. added 2018-02-16
    Where’s the Bridge? Epistemology and Epistemic Logic.Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):137-167.
    Epistemic logic begins with the recognition that our everyday talk about knowing and believing has some systematic features that we can track and re‡ect upon. Epistemic logicians have studied and extended these glints of systematic structure in fascinating and important ways since the early 1960s. However, for one reason or another, mainstream epistemologists have shown little interest. It is striking to contrast the marginal role of epistemic logic in contemporary epistemology with the centrality of modal logic for metaphysicians. This article (...)
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  49. added 2018-02-06
    Accuracy and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):62-96.
    Recently, several epistemologists have defended an attractive principle of epistemic rationality, which we shall call Ur-Prior Conditionalization. In this essay, I ask whether we can justify this principle by appealing to the epistemic goal of accuracy. I argue that any such accuracy-based argument will be in tension with Evidence Externalism, i.e., the view that agent's evidence may entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. This is because any such argument will crucially require the assumption that, independently of all empirical evidence, (...)
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  50. added 2018-01-30
    Composing Models.Jan van Eijck & Yanjing Wang - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (3-4):397-425.
    • We study a new composition operation on (epistemic) multiagent models and update actions that takes vocabulary extensions into account.
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