Norms and the Categories of Inaccurate Thinking

Ratio Juris 14 (1):10-33 (2001)
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Abstract

Two ways of thinking can be distinguished. The accurate way, based on causality and explanation, recognizes its ignorance on many items, but tries to organize and foster its knowledge on a solid basis. The innacurate way, based on indeterminacy, chance and free will, assumes with resignation there are segments of reality which cannot be known at all and does not try to go further on those items. Moral and legal discourses run the second way. That assumption tends to prevent them from fostering knowledge and leads normative sciences to irrationality and perplexity.

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