The arbitration conception of authority, law as integrity and normative positivism

Abstract
In the first part of my essay I will argue that there is a strong relationship between our view of authority and the desirability of preemptive reasons. More specifically, we have strong reasons to regard legal norms as preemptive reasons only if we accept the service conception of authority. I suggest, however, that an alternative account of authority - which I shall call the arbitrator model - gives us a better account of what legal authority demands and how it works. In the second part of my essay I suggest that we should recast the debate between Dworkinian law as integrity and normative positivism as a debate between two different attempts to put flesh on the bones of the arbitrator model of authority.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,188
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Normative Authority for Empirical Science.Wim de Muijnck - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):263-275.
Legitimacy is Not Authority.Jon Garthoff - 2010 - Law and Philosophy 29 (6):669-694.
Authority and Authorisation.B. Roermund - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (2):201-222.
Assessing Law's Claim to Authority.Bas van der Vossen - 2011 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (3):481-501.
The Role of Authority.Scott Hershovitz - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11 (7).
The Inevitability of Moral Evaluation.Peter Rijpkema - 2011 - Ratio Juris 24 (4):413-434.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

12 ( #369,867 of 2,153,830 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #398,274 of 2,153,830 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums