Abstract

This dissertation defends the possibility and importance of psychological theories that are both individualistic and intentional. By an individualistic theory, I mean a theory that assigns different psychological states to agents only if they differ in their internal states. By an intentional theory, I mean a theory that both attributes contents to psychological states and individuates psychological states on the basis of their contents. Philosophers have objected to theories of this kind on various grounds including internal inconsistency, disagreement with common sense psychology, and incompatibility with the assumptions and methods of cognitive science. I argue that these charges are ill-founded and that only theories that are both intentional and individualistic can satisfy certain conditions of adequacy on cognitive theories. ;The dissertation consists of four chapters. In chapter one, I defend the general thesis that working common sense systems of explanation place important prima facie constraints on the content of scientific theories. I then argue that we have good reason on the face of it to require that cognitive theories be both consistent with common sense psychology and capable of accounting for its relative effectiveness as a system of explanation. ;Chapter two makes a presumptive case for a view about the content of common sense psychology. I argue that common sense psychological explanation presupposes a concept of rationality that is both individualistic and intentional. Chapter three defends the coherence of this understanding of common sense psychology against arguments to the contrary by Putnam and Burge . I claim that these arguments depend on a defective theory of linguistic meaning and an inadequate criterion of individuation for mental contents. I defend an alternative theory of meaning and a related, individualistic criterion for classifying mental contents. Chapter four responds to an argument by Fodor purporting to show that assumptions about mental contents have no importance to cognitive science. I defend a general thesis about the relationship between formal and logical properties and then go on to argue that semantic assumptions are essential to judgements about the rationality of mental processes. Based on my arguments here and in chapter three, I conclude that only a theory that is both individualistic and intentional can account for the relative explanatory utility of common sense psychology.