Synthese 20 (3):308 - 334 (1969)
The distinction between explanation and prediction has received much attention in recent literature, but the equally important distinction between explanation and description (or between prediction and description) remains blurred. This latter distinction is particularly important in the social sciences, where probabilistic models (or theories) often play dual roles as explanatory and descriptive devices. The distinction between explanation (or prediction) and description is explicated in the present paper in terms of information theory. The explanatory (or predictive) power of a probabilistic model is identified with information taken from (or transmitted by) the environment (e.g., the independent, experimentally manipulated variables), while the descriptive power of a model reflects additional information taken from (or transmitted by) the data. Although information is usually transmitted by the data in the process of estimating parameters, it turns out that the number of free parameters is not a reliable index of transmitted information. Thus, the common practice of treating parameters as degrees-of-freedom in testing probabilistic models is questionable. Finally, this information-theoretic analysis of explanation, prediction, and description suggests ways of resolving some recent controversies surrounding the pragmatic aspects of explanation and the so-called structural identity thesis.
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References found in this work BETA
The Mathematical Theory of Communication.Claude E. Shannon & Warren Weaver - 1949 - University of Illinois Press.
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Studies in the Logic of Explanation.Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science.Herbert Feigl & Michael Scriven (eds.) - 1956 - , Vol.
Citations of this work BETA
Prediction in Epidemiology and Medicine.Jonathan Fuller, Alex Broadbent & Luis J. Flores - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C.
Single Case Propensities and the Explanation of Particular Events.Joseph F. Hanna - 1981 - Synthese 48 (3):409 - 436.
Prediction in Epidemiology and Medicine.Jonathan Fuller, Alex Broadbent & Luis J. Flores - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 54:45-48.
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