Aristotelian virtue and the nature of well-being

Abstract

A critique of perfectionist accounts of well-being, focusing on Aristotelian theories. While such views have more going for them than most critics have realized, virtue or excellence still forms no fundamental part of well-being. Seeing why illuminates interesting points about the nature of well-being. Draft 10/06/06; in review (comments most welcome).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Well-being and virtue.Dan Haybron - 2007 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (2):1-28.
Thomistic Eudaimonism, Virtue, and Well-Being.Matthew Shea - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):173-185.
Well-Being and the Good Death.Stephen M. Campbell - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3):607-623.
Virtue and Well-Being.Baril Anne - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 242-258.
Reduction vs. Elevation.Michael Slote - 1992 - In From morality to virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.
Happiness as Subjective Well-Being: An Aristotelian Critique.Tom Angier - 2020 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 76 (1):149-180.
Constructivist experimental philosophy on well-being and virtue.Matthew Braddock - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):295-323.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dan Haybron
Saint Louis University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references