Common‐Causes are Not Common Common‐Causes

Philosophy of Science 69 (4):623-636 (2002)
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Abstract

A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition of common-cause. The significance of the difference between common-causes and common common-causes is emphasized from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.

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Author Profiles

Miklós Rédei
London School of Economics
Laszlo E. Szabo
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences

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