Tomis Kapitan: Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives

Ted Honderich
University College London
What is the point of asking yourself what to do and then thinking hard about it if all the thinking is settled in advance? What is the point of trying to figure out how to run your life if determinism governs your every reflection? Do we not have to suppose that determinism is false if we are to take our own deliberations seriously? The question has long been taken to bedevil the doctrine of determinism. It has been supposed that determinists can have no good answer to it. Well, Professor Kapitan is one good philosopher who thinks otherwise. He takes things forward. His piece will repay your close attention.
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