Abstract

Temporal consciousness is philosophically problematic because it appears to have features that cannot be analyzed in a way compatible with the fundamental view of time as a one-dimensional order of events. For example, it seems to be a manifest fact of experience that within a strictly present state of consciousness one can be immediately aware of a succession of events, yet the standard view of time denies that successive events can co-exist, so how can they be given together in a present perceptual state? Such puzzles have occasionally led philosophers to reject scientific or mathematical theories of time. Some time ago C. D. Broad developed a largely unappreciated theory of temporal cognition to cope with these puzzles. In this paper the evolution of Broad’s theory is traced, and it is defended from the misinterpretations of later critics. Finally, it is suggested that a modification of Broad’s theory, which frees it from the trappings of sense-data epistemology, shows it to be compatible with sane current naturalistic approaches to experience that also would need to account for temporal experience within the framework of scientific time.