Abstract

Political theories often assume that there is an ideal political system applicable to all individuals. In recent years, however, there has been renewed interest in the ideal of political self-determination, according to which human beings, as individuals and as groups, should be free to control their own destiny, practice their own distinctive ways of life, and express commitment to their own values through traditions, law, and cultural practices. This ideal implicitly challenges the assumption that there is an ideal political system applicable to all groups. ;This dissertation examines the challenge to that assumption and argues that in the ideal it is morally appropriate, within certain specified limits, for different groups to be governed by different legal and/or political systems. In addition, this dissertation examines the implications of the content of legal rules being determined by decentralized political units. At least for some issues, it is argued, there are benefits to such organization. ;The primary arguments for the moral advantages of a variety of legal and political systems draw upon an examination of four pluralisms: judgment, individual, cultural, and value. I argue that a close examination of the implications of these pluralisms shows that in designing the best political system for a particular group of people, these pluralisms must be taken into account. Taking these pluralisms into account, however, requires developing different political systems for different groups of people. ;Examining the four pluralisms will involve evaluating John Rawls' recent work in Political Liberalism, a partial examination of an important criticism made by communitarians against liberalism, an evaluation of John Stuart Mill's important argument regarding the significance of options, as well as an examination of Will Kymlicka's work on culture. I also examine several difficulties that these consequences of the ideal of political self-determination raise.