Abstract

Immanuel Kant is frequently criticized for using what is called an "architectonic" to impose an artificial and overly systematic form upon the contents of the Critique of Pure Reason. But very little attention has been given to Kant's conception of architectonic, particularly as expressed in the chapter entitled, "The Architectonic of Pure Reason." This paper is a preliminary effort to correct this oversight in four chapters. ;Chapter One discusses the importance of architectonic conceived as a "teaching of the scientific" in philosophy and as an "art of systems." Kant understands architectonic to be a necessary part of his transcendental doctrine of method, inherently attached to his attempt at revolutionizing the procedure of dogmatic metaphysics and prescribing a system of ends reflecting the teleological and organic unity of human reason. A review of the literature shows that the low repute of Kant's architectonic originated with key neo-Kantian commentators who, mistakenly assuming that architectonic was a kind of philosophical architecture, presented psychological and historical hypotheses about it that have not and could not have been confirmed in the texts in which Kant reveals what he meant by it. ;Chapter Two traces the development of Kant's conception of architectonic, beginning with the problem of the "clarification of the world" formulated in the period 1747-1770, then considering his conception of a system in relation to an architectonical idea between 1772 and 1778, and finally showing that in the period just before the publication of the Critique, Kant discussed his main doctrines concerning the function and value of architectonic in terms of the general purposes of the "world-concept" of philosophy in sharp opposition to the "school-concept." ;Chapter Three is a study of possible historical bases for Kant's meaning of architectonic, tracing the vicissitudes of this peculiar word from Plato and Aristotle through Thomas and the Latin tradition, and finally through Leibniz, Wolff, and Lambert. The results show that there is philosophical substance to Kant's interest in a conception of architectonic that would be suitable for critical philosophy, although it also becomes apparent that well into the nineteenth century the meaning of architectonic remained extraordinarily confused. Historically, on the basis of its original meaning in Greek philosophy, Kant was quite justified in meaning a "lawgiving," "commanding," or "leading" art by architectonic, rather than any art of construction. ;Chapter Four discusses the main critical doctrines of "The Architectonic of Pure Reason," presenting a preliminary framework for understanding Kant's conception of architectonic as he meant it to apply to critical philosophy. Kant's dual formulation of architectonic as a "teaching of the scientific" and an "art of systems" can be understood in terms of his description of an ideal philosopher, a teacher who projects a schema for his use as a lawgiver of human reason, relating all cognitions properly to be called "philosophical" to the essential ends of human reason. A brief exposition is given of the actual architectonic produced by Kant in the Critique, but in the end it is seen that Kant's conception of architectonic far out stripped the use he made of it in his own philosophy