Abstract

Explaining the persistence of multiple interpretations of the same historical event has been an ongoing question in the philosophy of history. In this paper I illustrate two possible answers and argue that neither offers a satisfactory resolution. First of all, the realist view, which holds a metaphysical commitment to the past that precludes it from fully recognizing the legitimacy of variability of historical interpretations. Second, Ankersmit’s representationalism which seeks to overcome the realist view by introducing the notion of aspects. Nevertheless, I contend that this latter position ultimately proves indistinguishable from the sort of realist commitments it claims to avoid. In order to overcome these views, I argue that a new conception of historical aspects is needed. By developing a Wittgensteinian notion of aspect seeing, I provide a novel account of historical explanation. Wittgenstein’s insights allow us not only to explain the multiplicity of historical accounts but also to recognize the epistemic activity that goes into historiographical construction.