Davidson and first-person authority: Parataxis and self-expression

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):251-266 (2009)
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Abstract

Donald Davidson's explanation of first-person authority turns on an ingenious account of speakers' knowledge of meaning. It nonetheless suffers from a structural defect and yields, at best, expressive know-how for speakers. I argue that an expressivist strand already latent in Davidson's paratactic treatment of the semantics of belief attribution can be exploited to repair the defect, and so to yield a plausible account of first-person authority.

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Rockney Jacobsen
Wilfrid Laurier University

References found in this work

Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Truth, language and history.Donald Davidson - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
First person authority.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (2‐3):101-112.
The Mind of Donald Davidson.Donald Davidson - 1989 - Netherlands: Rodopi.

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