Davidson and first-person authority: Parataxis and self-expression

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):251-266 (2009)
Donald Davidson's explanation of first-person authority turns on an ingenious account of speakers' knowledge of meaning. It nonetheless suffers from a structural defect and yields, at best, expressive know-how for speakers. I argue that an expressivist strand already latent in Davidson's paratactic treatment of the semantics of belief attribution can be exploited to repair the defect, and so to yield a plausible account of first-person authority.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01339.x
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Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Truth, Language and History.Donald Davidson - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
The Mind of Donald Davidson.Donald Davidson - 1989 - Netherlands: Rodopi.

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