Abstract

A simple but valuable experience that all humans have in common is that their life and their actions, the things they do and the things they omit to do, their reflection and their praxis are always marked by the tension which exists between what is factual and what is appropriate. Ethics can be described in simple terms as the systematic reflection on this tension, an endeavour to explicate how notions such as ‘appropriateness’ can be translated into categories such as ‘goodness’ and ‘rightness’ in such a way that we do not remain bogged down in this experience but can develop some kind of assessment. One can also say, therefore, that ethics has a critical approach: the aforementioned tension is not merely noted and left at that, it is scrutinised, studied and assessed on the basis of a particular measure or criterion, thus making it possible, for example, to distinguish between the acknowledgement of changes and the appreciation of improvements .Every theory of ethics which consistently aspires to such a critical reflection, therefore, will have to deal with the question how the aforementioned criterion can be put into words. I already pointed to our common experience of the tension between the actual and the appropriate. In an effort to pin down the criterion in question, a useful point of departure might be to reflect for a moment on what is meant by appropriate. The term itself hints at some kind of relation or belonging to. If, then, the appropriate can be formulated in terms of belonging to ‘the human’ then an understanding of what it is to be human will always constitute the point of departure of any critical ethical reflection. For those who might be tempted to view this as too deductive, the whole approach can be turned on its head: the specific sort of reflection in which people engage with respect to the tension between the actual and the appropriate and in which the appropriate can be formulated in terms of the human, is ethics.[...]In the present article I intend to focus on the image of the human person which is compatible with such a notion of ethical obedience as responsibility to-be-taken-up. The fact that people speak today of a ‘changing of the guard’ when it comes to fundamental ethics is certainly no exaggeration. An ethics founded on natural law has been evolving towards the use of the notion personalism as a designation for an inclusive anthropology which is the expression of the appropriate. Experience teaches that a substantive explanation of personalism — which I provide in the third part of this article — is best preceded by a methodical sketch concerning the ‘status’ of personalism as a fundamental ethical category. In the fourth part of the article I will endeavour to outline the contours of a personalist theory of action