Reasonable Doubt, Robust Evidential Probability and the Unknown

Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (2):451-470 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Most legal evidence scholars agree that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt requires the belief that the defendant probably committed the alleged acts. However, they also agree that this is not a sufficient condition, as this belief may be unreasonable. I focus on two popular proposals for additional conditions: (i) that the degree of belief should be robust and (ii) that it should be reasonable given the available evidence (should be an evidential probability). Both criteria face difficulties regarding their meaning and utility. I propose an interpretation which overcomes these difficulties and which combines the two conditions into a single criterion on which both conditions are about the possibility of overlooked, exculpatory information. Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt requires that we are sufficiently certain that we did not miss such information for the sake of achieving accurate beliefs and a just error distribution. How certain we can be that we did not miss anything relevant depends on our higher-order evidence. One important type of higher-order evidence is whether the hypotheses under consideration are sufficiently detailed. This point leads to a novel way of combining the Bayesian and explanation-based accounts of rational legal proof.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,745

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

When Does Evidence Support Guilt “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”?Gideon Yaffe - 2019 - In Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Applied Ethics and the Criminal Law. Springer Verlag. pp. 97-116.
Rethinking Criminal Law. [REVIEW]Andrew Botterell - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 22:93-112.
The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.
Criminal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?Lewis Ross - 2023 - The Philosophical Quarterly.
Criminal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?Lewis Ross - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly (4):1-23.
Reasonable Self-doubt.Ofer Malcai & Ram Rivlin - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (1):25-45.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-25

Downloads
16 (#227,957)

6 months
8 (#1,326,708)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.
Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 193.

View all 21 references / Add more references