Why It Wouldn't Be Rational to Believe You're in The Good Place (and Why You Wouldn't Want to Be There Anyway)

In Kimberly S. Engels (ed.), The Good Place and Philosophy. Wiley. pp. 270–282 (2020-08-27)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Good Place is about moral philosophy. But one reason everyone hates moral philosophers is that they think everything is about ethics. When it comes to the Good Place versus Bad Place hypothesis, the big giveaway is simplicity. The Good Place hypothesis doesn't require a grand deception and all the planning that would be necessary to keep it afloat. The Bad Place hypothesis does. The biggest worry about an eternal life in something like The Good Place was made famous by the philosopher Bernard Williams: boredom. Although it might take a while, The Good Place would eventually, and inevitably, turn into The Bad Place. Immortality would become torture. As Williams points out, even though a desire for immorality is irrational, the state of being dead is itself nothing to dread—it's still perfectly rational to want to live a longer life rather than a shorter life.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,881

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Death, Meaning, and Existential Crises.Kiki Berk - 2020-08-27 - In Kimberly S. Engels (ed.), The Good Place and Philosophy. Wiley. pp. 153–165.
The Medium Place.Catherine M. Robb - 2020-08-27 - In Kimberly S. Engels (ed.), The Good Place and Philosophy. Wiley. pp. 75–86.
Eternity, Boredom, and One’s Part-Whole-Reality Conception.William A. Lauinger - 2014 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):1-28.
Luck and Fairness in The Good Place.Scott A. Davison & Andrew R. Davison - 2020-08-27 - In Kimberly S. Engels (ed.), The Good Place and Philosophy. Wiley. pp. 25–33.
Boredom, Human Psychology, and Immortality.Andreas Elpidorou - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (4):259-372.
Immortal Curiosity.Attila Tanyi & Karl Karlander - 2013 - Philosophical Forum 44 (3):255-273.
Mumford on Absence & Nothing.Andrea Raimondi & Mark Jago - 2022 - Analysis 83 (1):186-197.
Immortality and Boredom.John Martin Fischer & Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (4):353-372.
Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’.Finnur Dellsén - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):157-177.
Conceptions of the Afterlife.Michael McGowan - 2020-08-27 - In Kimberly S. Engels (ed.), The Good Place and Philosophy. Wiley. pp. 189–201.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
7 (#1,387,247)

6 months
4 (#790,394)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references