In Memory We Trust?

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 18:69-73 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The common sense regards memory as fairly exact, reliable and trustworthy in the majority of cases. However, latest scientific findings in the fields of psychology and biology seem to object this point of view. According to them, memory appears as a highly constructive and often deceptive phenomenon. These assumptionslead to various philosophical problems. The talk will address some of them. At first the question will be raised which conclusions can be reasonably drawn from empirical findings brought by memory research. Based on this analysis the relation between memory and truth will be examined more closely. Therefore I will ask which concept of truth respectively accuracy could be compatible with a constructive and dynamic character of memory and whether these insights will give rise to a change of our self-concept or the idea of man in general. This requires an inquiry of the relationship between self-concept and (autobiographical) memory that can be illustrated by the case-study of traumatical disorders, a field which so far is stunningly unnoted by philosophy. As a result of these findings some main features and further problems of the anthropological dimension of memory will be outlined.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,932

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

In Memory We Trust?Michael Jungert - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 54:13-20.
Memory Formation and Belief.Tzofit Ofengenden - 2014 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 7 (2):34-44.
A critique of the causal theory of memory.Marina Trakas - 2010 - Dissertation, Ecole des Hautes Etudes En Sciences Sociales

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-04

Downloads
30 (#520,442)

6 months
2 (#1,446,987)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references