The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective

&
Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuro- science explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phe- nomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive fields are explored.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1086/661755

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Dynamical Models and Explanation in Neuroscience.Lauren N. Ross - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (1):32-54.
The Non-mechanistic Option: Defending Dynamical Explanations.Russell Meyer - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):959-985.
Dynamical Models: An Alternative or Complement to Mechanistic Explanations?David M. Kaplan & William Bechtel - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):438-444.
Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science: explanatory power, understanding, and the ‘mere description’ worry.Raoul Gervais - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):43-66.
‘Models of’ and ‘Models for’: On the Relation between Mechanistic Models and Experimental Strategies in Molecular Biology.Emanuele Ratti - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):773-797.
Explanation and description in computational neuroscience.David Michael Kaplan - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):339-373.
Mechanistic Models and the Explanatory Limits of Machine Learning.Emanuele Ratti & Ezequiel López-Rubio - unknown
Plausibility versus richness in mechanistic models.Raoul Gervais & Erik Weber - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):139-152.
In Defense of Dynamical Explanation.Shannon B. Nolen - unknown
Cognitive dynamical models as minimal models.Travis Holmes - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1):2353-2373.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-09-22

Downloads
349 (#60,843)

6 months
24 (#121,446)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Carl F. Craver
Washington University in St. Louis

Citations of this work

Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification, and Explanation.Stephan Hartmann & Matteo Colombo - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).
Minimal Model Explanations.Robert W. Batterman & Collin C. Rice - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (3):349-376.

View all 179 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Explanation: a mechanist alternative.William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.
A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action.David Morris, E. Thelen & L. B. Smith - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2).

View all 27 references / Add more references