Abstract

What, if any, kind of inferential reasoning can be a legitimate source of justified aesthetic belief? Looking at deductive and inductive reasoning respectively, this paper concludes that only the latter can be formulated so that there is reason to accept the premises as true and thus justify the conclusion. This follows from considerations about the type of generalisations that the arguments rely on. Universal generalisations, on which the type of deductive reasoning under consideration relies, are always victim to counterexamples. Also, they are incompatible with a reasonable conception of the relationship between an aesthetic property and its correlating set of non-aesthetic properties. The generalisations that inductive aesthetic reasoning relies on, however, evade the problems faced by deduction as well as are compatible and a natural complement to the common aesthetic practice of acquaintance having epistemic authority over reasoning. These considerations lead to the conclusion that inductive, while not deductive, aesthetic reasoning is a legitimate source for justified aesthetic belief.