Reasons First, by Mark Schroeder

Mind (forthcoming)
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Abstract

I may be allergic to Reasons First views (views, that is, views according to which all normative phenomena can be explained or analysed in terms of normative re.

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10.1093/mind/fzac042

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Stephen Kearns
Florida State University

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Reasons as Defaults.John Horty - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-28.
Ambiguous rationality.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):263-274.

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