Scientific naming

Philosophy of Science 25 (3):185-193 (1958)
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Abstract

Theory and Practice; Precision and Vagueness. There has long been a conflict between the theory and the practice of scientific naming. The theory expressed both by working scientists and by philosophers has almost always been that precision is an essential part of the scientific attitude and of the procedures and results of science. Theoretically, metaphors have been scorned as belonging to poetry or to philosophy rather than to science. In scientific practice, however, vagueness and metaphor are constantly present; and they are particularly evident at the advancing frontiers of any science, whether mathematical, natural, or social.

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