Abstract

In recent debate between realism and anti-realism, theory of explanation plays an important role. Explanation is not metaphysically neutral. It depends upon philosophical positions. Whatever philosophical positions one has, the central questions about explanations are as follows: What is a good explanation? and how do we judge the satisfactoriness of proposed explanation? Why do we value explanation and why is the relationship between explanatory power and theory choice? ;In my dissertation, what I show is that scientific explanation is largely causal explanation in realist sense and realist theory of explanation only can meet the central questions. I also apply the causal theory of explanation to various fields, Bell-type phenomenon, social explanation and technological explanation. ;In Chapter 1, I discuss the theory of explanation in empiricist viewpoint, Hempel's covering model and van Fraassen's pragmatic theory of explanation. I show that the two theories of explanation cannot resolve the asymmetry problems and the relationship between theory choice and explanatory power. In Chapter 2, Putnam's internal realism and his concept of causation are discussed. In chapter 3, I discuss non-Humean concept of causation and causal theory of explanation. I also criticize Philip Kitcher's explanation as unification. ;I apply the causal theory of explanation to various fields of human inquiry. EPR-Bell type correlation, social explanation and technological explanation. In Chapter 4, I discuss Bell-type correlations and causal explanation. I defend causal theory of explanation for Bell-type correlation by adopting causal holism. ;In Chapter 5, I discuss social explanation and causal explanation. I defend the view that both individual and structure have causal power. I discuss individuation, microfoundation and holism. I proposes dialectic epistemology to understand holistic world. ;Finally, I discuss science-technology relationship, design rule and technological explanation. I argue that engineering sciences, important parts of technological knowledge have their own ontologies different from science. I defend the view that technological explanation is largely causal explanation