Abstract

This work is a "development" of "Pyrrhonism Sextusian" in two senses: primarily, it is a detailed disclosure of the Pyrrhonism extant in the writings of Sextus Empiricus; secondly, it juxtaposes to these writings utterances of others which appear as developments of aspects of Sextus's Pyrrhonism. ;A long chapter on Sextus divides in three. The semantic axes epoche-synkatathesis and adela-phainomena are examined; and the equipollence-epoche-ataraxy and metriopathy chain is traced. Then is detailed Sextus's response to the charge that one who accepts no statement cannot act: our experience disposes us to follow phenomenal semiotic maxims ; this suffices for action. Sextus's use of language is scrutinized. It is found that in uttering arguments, the Pyrrhonic sayings, and those statements which communicate the "character of skepticism," Sextus does not "assert" but merely follows abouletos the speech customs of his sect; while in ordinary life he follows the speech customs of his companions. ; to the charge that the radical skeptic, lacking "belief," cannot act, Chapter III points out, Sextus, Hume, and Santayana all intimate that humans must "believe": assent to commemorative signs; believe impressions and ideas; have "animal faith" in these and in substance, they respectively say. Next is studied Arne Naess's defense of the Pyrrhonist against this charge, before, at the end of the chapter, it is argued that acceptance of statements is not necessary for action. ;Chapter IV rejects Popkin's claim that the Pyrrhonist will naturally assert; consolidates Hannay's thesis that the Pyrrhonist can in ordinary contexts satisfy the felicity conditions for assertion; examines Sextus's practice of opposing conceptions to one another; and finally, having stated the ways one can be skeptical about term-meaning, outlines Mauthner's term-meaning-skepticism, which appears as if in support of Sextus's speaking "kata to phainomenon." ;The last chapter defines "skepticism"; contrasts dogmatic and Pyrrhonic skepticism; classifies dogmatic skepticisms by strength; and considers arguments for, but suspends judgment upon, whether Pyrrhonism or the strongest dogmatic skepticism is stronger