Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge

Philosophical Review 107 (2):324 (1998)
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Abstract

Once upon a time, logic was the philosopher’s tool for analyzing scientific reasoning. Nowadays, probability and statistics have largely replaced logic, and their most popular application—Bayesianism—has replaced the qualitative deductive relationship between a hypothesis h and evidence e with a quantitative measure of h’s probability in light of e.

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Deborah Mayo
Virginia Tech

Citations of this work

The Costs of HARKing.Mark Rubin - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):535-560.
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A new critique of theological interpretations of physical cosmology.A. Grünbaum - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):1-43.

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