Abstract
The theoretical gap with the action actually performed is one of the fundamental problems of anthropology and the theory of action. To understand it, it is worth turning to the antitheoretical and anti-formalist pathos of the "late" Wittgenstein, which opposes all attempts to describe action and language in terms of rules and abstract structures. A critical analysis of the assumptions of intellectualism borrowed from simple common sense allows us to show that the logical analysis of action and language deals not with a real language, but with an artificially created abstraction. The article attempts to show the positive significance of this criticism. The main conclusion of the study is that a thinker is able to adequately understand action and language if he also makes his own scientific attitude to them the subject of his analysis. Only in this way can we hope to transform Wittgenstein's antitheoretical pathos into the basis of a constructive study of action and language. The tools of scientific analysis are often much more rigorous and logical than its subject. Wittgenstein's analysis of language games and the life form behind them is an attempt to avoid such too strict and too logical methods and constructions in anthropology, philosophy of action and philosophy of language. The novelty of the research lies in the application of Wittgenstein's ideas to clarify the weaknesses and difficulties faced by the humanities in the XX century and today, as well as to find a way out of these difficulties. The relevance of the work is connected with the great interest of modern logicians and philosophers in Wittgenstein's work, with the urgent need to identify new ways of developing philosophical anthropology.