Probabilities as truth-value estimates

Philosophy of Science 28 (4):414-417 (1961)
Abstract
The author recently claimed that Pr(P, Q), where Pr is a probability function and P and Q are two sentences of a formalized language L, qualifies as an estimate--made in the light of Q--of the truth-value of P in L. To substantiate his claim, the author establishes here that the two strategies lying at the opposite extremes of the spectrum of truth-value estimating strategies meet the first five of the six requirements (R1-R6) currently placed upon probability functions and fail to meet the sixth one. He concludes from those two results that the value for P and Q of any function satisfying R1-R5 must rate "minimally satisfactory" and the value for P and Q of any function satisfying R1-R6 must rate "satisfactory" as an estimate--made in the light of Q--of the truth-value of P in L
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DOI 10.1086/287827
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