Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ANALOGIES OF BEING IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS RICHARD LEE New School for Social Research New York, New York IN HIS Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Aquinas offers three modes of analogy.1 The three modes offered there are referred to, though not by the names given them, throughout his works. It remains a curious fact, however, that Aquinas varies his opinion as to whether analogy of attribution or analogy of proportionality (sometimes referred to as analogy of proper proportionality as attribution is referred to in the literature as analogy of proportion) is the proper mode of analogical predication. In fact, as we shall see, Aquinas himself imports elements of the analogy of attribution into the analogy of proportionality. What needs to be investigated, then, is what characterizes these two modes of analogy; what makes them both analogy; why do they differ. Before understanding the specific nature of each form of analogy, however, one should understand why Aquinas appealed to analogy in the first place. Finally, one should attempt to grasp what the implications of each form of analogy are for Aquinas's metaphysical system and why he seems to favor the analogy of attribution over that of proportionality at crucial points in his thought. Why analogy? In general, one can say that Aquinas uses the concept of analogy (and that of proportionality) to solve two problems. On the one hand, the concept of analogy is used to argue that God does, 1 In I sent., 19. 5. 2, ad 1. 471 472 RICHARD LEE in fact, have knowledge of his creatures. The issue here is that the intellect knows in proportion to the thing known. However, God is infinite and if he knows anything finite he would know that thing in proportion to the created, finite thing. Since there is no proportion between finite and infinite, God cannot have any knowledge of his creatures.2 The element of knowledge, however, is not merely a preface to the discussion of the types of analogy. Aquinas argues that we can name a thing insofar as it is known.3 Since we have no concept of God (in his essence), we cannot name God, at least in the same way we name other things. On the other hand, Aquinas uses analogy to fill a metaphysical gap in his system. For he agrees with Pseudo-Dionysius and Maimonides that we cannot know God in his essence. Therefore, any names that we apply to God are not names which tell us anything about God. Aquinas is well aware that the God of revelation is not a God about whom one ought to speak. To say anything at all about God is already to say too much; it is already doomed to failure because of God one should not speak. However, this situation leaves Aquinas in a peculiar position. For he takes seriously the Aristotelian dictum that a thing is known only when its principles are known.4 If God is the principle, something must be known of him if anything is to be known at all. There must be some way to speak of God. Aquinas sees in analogy a middle ground between these two positions. For what he seeks is a mode of predication that lies between univocity and equivocity. In other words, he seeks a mode of predication that predicates the same thing in a different way of two (or more) things. In univocal predication the same term is applied according to the same ratio.5 Thus, the community 2 This is the issue, for example, in De Veritate, q. 8, a. 1, ad 6; De Veritate, q. 2, a.3, ad 4. 3 Cf. Summa Theologiae I, 13, 1, c. 4 For example, cf. Physics I, 1. 5 One is tempted to render ratio as " definition." However, it is not clear that definition is enough. Clearly, in univocal predication the definition must be the same (e.g., predicating animal of man and ox). But is it enough that only the definition is the same? Is there not some metaphysical element lack- THE ANALOGIF'.$ OF BEING 473 that applies to univocal predication is one of identity. The concept of animal...